What does theological postliberalism look like in practice? Go review Archbishop Williams' statements criticizing various aspects of political liberalism in the UK and TEC. What does postmodernism look like in practice? I'd concur with Michael Poon: GAFCON. He says,
GAFCON holds before the Communion a new and unfamiliar utopia that is post-modern to its core. Webmasters and web bloggers render synodical processes irrelevant. They preside over web blogs in the virtual worlds of their own fabrication. Its power in shaping public opinion on ecclesiastical authorities simply cannot be ignored. A communion that is no longer dependent on patient face-to-face encounters and governed by geographical proximity: it is a Gnostic gospel that renders the Cross in vain.
I. Argument...
That last clause sounds like hyperbole, but let's take it seriously for a moment. What's the argument? Maybe this:
(1) Communion requires face-to-face encounters.
(2) Face-to-face encounters require geographical proximity.
(3) GAFCON's utopia is incompatible with geographical proximity.
Thus, (4) GAFCON's utopia is incompatible with communion.
But, (5) The Gospel and Cross require communion.
Thus, (6) GAFCON's utopia is incompatible with the Gospel and Cross.
Well, Poon does have an argument here worth taking very seriously if you're a Separatist, and it has prima facie credibility. In particular, one could work up considerable support from Christian tradition for the crucial, contended premise (1). It seems to me (2) and (5) are beyond reasonable doubt, and I trust Poon as a reliable source for (3), as it seems to fit with much of what comes through larger media groups about GAFCON. In sum: I take (3) as true at least for the near future and (2) with (5) as true simpliciter. As (6) follows from (4) and (5), and (4) from (1)-(3), the whole argument rests on the truth or falsity of premise (1).
So what of it? Does communion require face-to-face encounters? That is the issue on which Poon's confrontation with postmodernism hinges. I take it we're not talking merely about Holy Communion or the Mass, as (1) would surely then be trivially true, but irrelevant to Poon's argument. GAFCON isn't envisioning a fully virtual Mass, complete with sacramental simulacra rendering Real Presence really problematic. I take it Poon's talking about communion in a wider sense, about something like communion-in-concrete-community where the relevant ecclesial units are marked by a community sharing a form of life in bodily proximity. Dioceses consisting of geographically discontinuous congregations in mostly virtual contact--cultivation of which GAFCON seems to be holding out as a constitutive, necessary step in its proper development--lacks a form of life in bodily proximity or what I've called concrete community.
The staunch postmodernist might well be unimpressed: virtual contact between congregations suffices for the kind of community called for by the Gospel and Cross: e-mails, webcam-speeches, blog posts, webcasts, etc, etc can really be strung together in some configuration constituting Gospel community between congregations. But is the postmodernist right? I don't think so; here, rather, Poon is right, so far as I can tell.
What a virtual cluster of congregations crucially lacks is (a) the relevant kind of connection between members of its disjoined congregations and (b) between members of its congrgations and the world in bodily proximity outside of thecongregations. For both (a) and (b), one should see that human life necessarily consists of bodily interactions in which the Gospel and one's response to the Cross is lived out. Not even the Resurrection seems to cancel that truth out about us. That is, we are just not the type of beings who could live apart from bodily connections--and it is just those connections which, minimally, are held out by the Gospel as the arena within which we make our response to the Gospel and the Cross. GAFCON's postmodernism seems to imply that exactly those connections can be surrendered in a faithful, orthodox Christian life in return for mostly virtual connections.
That is precisely the bite of Poon's point about GAFCON's gnosticism: the implicit picture of human beings as satsified in their response to the Gospel and the Cross by merely virtual community as the ground for real communion. That picture is analogous to Gnostic Platonism's picture of humans as spirit beings called to leave crude matter behind. The historical Gnostics cultivated an interior, immaterial spiritual self; the GAFCON-gnostics cultivate an interior, dematerialized virtual self. True, the virtual is not the spiritual, but Poon has hit upon a good analogy. Whether the self to be redeemed in communion is pictured as spriritual or virtual, what is denied in consequence is the gravity of the material human being and material human relationships. There is, then, something to be said for Poon's premise (1).
II. ...and consequences
You will have noticed that the apparent soundness of Poon's argument leaves us with the rather sharp claim of (6):
GAFCON's utopia is incompatible with the Gospel and the Cross.
Apparently, ecclesiology matters after all, and the order of the church, and in particular the polity of the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Church of Canada, matters as well. For that polity is the order within which a common life in all of its gritty materiality, materiality identified by Poon as necessary to responding to the Gospel and the Cross, is carried on.
It is perhaps odd to think of treating that fragile common life, that embarassingly fragile common life, as something so grave that ostentatiously prima facie orthodox parallel groupings as GAFCON supports (think AMiA, CANA, etc) would in reality be so radically unorthodox.
At least one would suppose serious Anglo-catholics in Fort Worth and elsewhere--for whom ecclesiology is already important--would hesitate before following Schofield into a virtual community. It seems that is just what Poon is talking about: real community dissolving in the acids of virtual community, an unhappy real world traded for the shiny silver of the postmodern utopia.
Martins on Schori's Actions in the DSJ
Although Dan Martins has repeatedly made alot of noise about the PB's efforts in the DSJ, the issue of whether the PB is permitted canonically to do what she is doing in the DSJ should be settled, in my view, by Canon I.2.4:
The Presiding Bishop shall be the Chief Pastor and Primate
of the Church, and shall:
(1) Be charged with responsibility for leadership in initiating
and developing the policy and strategy in the Church and
speaking for the Church as to the policies, strategies and
programs authorized by the General Convention;....
(3) In the event of an Episcopal vacancy within a Diocese,
consult with the Ecclesiastical Authority to ensure that
adequate interim Episcopal Services are provided;
Part of being a Chief Primate for the DSJ is having a power to initiate and develop policy. In cases of pressing need beyond precedent, as exists in the DSJ, doesn't it seem that such a power would be operative, if anywhere? It seems like common sense to me; this is exactly what she is doing in the DSJ: initiating and developing policy.
Moreover, (3) above charges here with a duty--properly exercised only in council--to ensure adequate interim episcopal services. Such actions are not merely supererogatory. And that is exactly what she is doing, carring out her canonical duties to ensure adequate interim episcopal care.
But what seems obvious to me is not obvious to Martins. Perhaps he has some reading of the canons where black is white and white black, and the PB is not permitted by the canon I cite to do what she has done. Would General Convention then have the requisite authority for Martins? It seems to me--though I may be mistaken, of course--that
(1) the General Convention is the highest administrative authority in the Episcopal Church.
The GC makes the rules, etc within which the rest of TEC is bound to proceed. But as the GC only meets at long intervals, it is necessary that authority in the interim be delegated. It should come as no surprise that, reading I.IV.4, sections 1a & 2e,
(2) the Executive Council may act on behalf of the General Convention,
and presumably the GC can both bind and overturn decisions of the EC, or they may choose not to, and by their silence validate the EC's actions--see section 1b. The EC of the GC may have need for someone like the PB to do the same kind of thing the EC does for the GC. After all, the PB is a member of the EC by section 1c. Sometimes action must be taken which the EC is not in a position to implement for practical reasons: meeting at intervals or the need for a member of the EC to take the lead in delineating a policy. Thus, it should come as no surprise that
(3) the Presiding Bishop may act on behalf of the Executive Council,
and presumably the GC and EC could both bind and overturn the decisions of the PB, or they may choose not to do so, and by silence validate the PB's actions. That the EC may so delegate its power seems implied by the canonical provision in 2e that it
may initiate and develop such new work as it may deem necessary.
and more importantly by I.IV.4.3a & f, which hold the PB is President, Chair, and CEO of the EC, permitted to implement its work. That is not to deny other parts of TEC, like the HoB, may similarly delegate authority to the PB. Thus, I take it that
(4) the Presiding Bishop may act on occasion with the highest administrative authority in the Episcopal Church,
inasmuch as that authority is delegated transitively to the PB. That is, on occasion the PB may act to do what you would expect the GC to be able to do, because that authority is delegated to the PB. And in addition, I mean to say not only that (1)-(4) are just what sound common sense would expect, but that they are also consistent with the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church.
It is important to see that (4) does not imply the PB may act as a sovereign authority, above the canons and constitution, unaccountable to anyone in TEC. To the contrary, I hope that the way I have argued for (4) shows the power referred to in (4) is conditional and circumscribed. Inasmuch as it is strictly a delegated potency, lines of accountability are clear: the PB answers to the EC and to the GC. Moreover, the authority referred to in (4) is operative only in the absence of a potentiality--in practical terms--for the exercise of authority by the EC and GC. In that sense, the power of the PB is conditional.
All of this would seem to come as a surprise to Dan Martins, who writes
Anyone who is complicit in the election of a new Standing Committee at the special convention is acting in defiance of the Constitution and Canons, and is appropriately subject to ecclesiastical discipline.
Well, he's entitled to his opinion. Evidently, he seems to believe or at least be committed to
(5) the Presiding Bishop is forbidden from acting on any occasion with the highest authority in the Episcopal Church,
perhaps because he also holds or is committed to
(6) the power of the EC of GC cannot on any occasion be delgated to the PB without some express designation,
like a GC or EC resolution explicitly to that effect. I do not think he, or anyone else in the DSJ, has managed to argue soundly for (5) or (6).
Indeed, ironically enough, the power Martins arrogates to the SC of the DSJ only exists in the absence of the DSJ's bishop on condition the GC permits; see the Constitution, Article IV:
When there is a Bishop in charge of the
Diocese, the Standing Committee shall be the Bishop's Council of
Advice. If there be no Bishop or Bishop Coadjutor or Suffragan
Bishop canonically authorized to act, the Standing Committee shall be
the Ecclesiastical Authority of the Diocese for all purposes declared
by the General Convention.
The power of the SC of the DSJ in the absence of a bishop is not absolute; it is rather conditional. If the authority of the GC may be delegated to the PB, then of course the PB may do exactly what she has in fact done--notify the SC that its authority is suspended. There is a case to be made that--contrary to Martins--the PB has precisely this power according to the Constitution itself.
I hope to have shown the rather ill-tempered comment by Martins that the PB's effort in the DSJ
represents the raw exercise of naked illicit power by the Presiding Bishop
is not adequately grounded in reality. Is it really raw and naked when a case can be made for it directly from the Constitution and Canons? Why the nasty hyperbole? We have yet to see a decent argument that it is in fact illicit, and it seems given his penchant for strife, we are owed at least that.
P.S.
My apologies: I actually like theorizing over law; maybe there's a calling. Who knows? Anyhow, here are a couple more speculative arguments: enjoy.
According to the Constitution in Article V, section 1 the GC is the agent behind the formation of a new diocese. The DSJ is not a new diocese being formed, but an old diocese whose normal administrative apparatus is being reconstituted. The authority to form a new diocese is greater; it follows that GC would have the lesser power to reconsititute if need be. of course, this is already implicit in my Proposition (1) above; these comments serve so far only to confirm (1) supra. As that authority, normally residing in the GC, may be delegated to the PB in virtue of the power inherent in her office, it follows the PB may do what she is doing by the authority of TEC's Constitution, contrary to Martins.
Note at any rate, Article V, section 3 of the Constitution gives a new diocese the power to designate its own bishop, should bishops from dioceses from which it was formed prescind from occupying that office. Normally that power would most likely be overseen in its exercise by the Standing Committee. At any rate, a power to designate a bishop is not alien to the diocese; this section may provide a relevant precedent for action in unusual circumstances, even though the DSJ is not new; it is, of course, an old diocese in an unusual--even unprecedented--situation. That is, given it seems that the Standing Committee of the DSJ is unable to perform, the current PB may simply be acting on behalf of the GC to recognize, and thereby validate, an exercise of power--permitted in the Constitution--by the DSJ on its own behalf. While the SC might be the normal conduit for the flow of this power, it is by no means necessary for the flow of that power, as the power is inherent in the diocese itself. That exercise would be permitted, based on a power inherent in the diocese, referred to in this section--again, contrary to Martins.
The Presiding Bishop shall be the Chief Pastor and Primate
of the Church, and shall:
(1) Be charged with responsibility for leadership in initiating
and developing the policy and strategy in the Church and
speaking for the Church as to the policies, strategies and
programs authorized by the General Convention;....
(3) In the event of an Episcopal vacancy within a Diocese,
consult with the Ecclesiastical Authority to ensure that
adequate interim Episcopal Services are provided;
Part of being a Chief Primate for the DSJ is having a power to initiate and develop policy. In cases of pressing need beyond precedent, as exists in the DSJ, doesn't it seem that such a power would be operative, if anywhere? It seems like common sense to me; this is exactly what she is doing in the DSJ: initiating and developing policy.
Moreover, (3) above charges here with a duty--properly exercised only in council--to ensure adequate interim episcopal services. Such actions are not merely supererogatory. And that is exactly what she is doing, carring out her canonical duties to ensure adequate interim episcopal care.
But what seems obvious to me is not obvious to Martins. Perhaps he has some reading of the canons where black is white and white black, and the PB is not permitted by the canon I cite to do what she has done. Would General Convention then have the requisite authority for Martins? It seems to me--though I may be mistaken, of course--that
(1) the General Convention is the highest administrative authority in the Episcopal Church.
The GC makes the rules, etc within which the rest of TEC is bound to proceed. But as the GC only meets at long intervals, it is necessary that authority in the interim be delegated. It should come as no surprise that, reading I.IV.4, sections 1a & 2e,
(2) the Executive Council may act on behalf of the General Convention,
and presumably the GC can both bind and overturn decisions of the EC, or they may choose not to, and by their silence validate the EC's actions--see section 1b. The EC of the GC may have need for someone like the PB to do the same kind of thing the EC does for the GC. After all, the PB is a member of the EC by section 1c. Sometimes action must be taken which the EC is not in a position to implement for practical reasons: meeting at intervals or the need for a member of the EC to take the lead in delineating a policy. Thus, it should come as no surprise that
(3) the Presiding Bishop may act on behalf of the Executive Council,
and presumably the GC and EC could both bind and overturn the decisions of the PB, or they may choose not to do so, and by silence validate the PB's actions. That the EC may so delegate its power seems implied by the canonical provision in 2e that it
may initiate and develop such new work as it may deem necessary.
and more importantly by I.IV.4.3a & f, which hold the PB is President, Chair, and CEO of the EC, permitted to implement its work. That is not to deny other parts of TEC, like the HoB, may similarly delegate authority to the PB. Thus, I take it that
(4) the Presiding Bishop may act on occasion with the highest administrative authority in the Episcopal Church,
inasmuch as that authority is delegated transitively to the PB. That is, on occasion the PB may act to do what you would expect the GC to be able to do, because that authority is delegated to the PB. And in addition, I mean to say not only that (1)-(4) are just what sound common sense would expect, but that they are also consistent with the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church.
It is important to see that (4) does not imply the PB may act as a sovereign authority, above the canons and constitution, unaccountable to anyone in TEC. To the contrary, I hope that the way I have argued for (4) shows the power referred to in (4) is conditional and circumscribed. Inasmuch as it is strictly a delegated potency, lines of accountability are clear: the PB answers to the EC and to the GC. Moreover, the authority referred to in (4) is operative only in the absence of a potentiality--in practical terms--for the exercise of authority by the EC and GC. In that sense, the power of the PB is conditional.
All of this would seem to come as a surprise to Dan Martins, who writes
Anyone who is complicit in the election of a new Standing Committee at the special convention is acting in defiance of the Constitution and Canons, and is appropriately subject to ecclesiastical discipline.
Well, he's entitled to his opinion. Evidently, he seems to believe or at least be committed to
(5) the Presiding Bishop is forbidden from acting on any occasion with the highest authority in the Episcopal Church,
perhaps because he also holds or is committed to
(6) the power of the EC of GC cannot on any occasion be delgated to the PB without some express designation,
like a GC or EC resolution explicitly to that effect. I do not think he, or anyone else in the DSJ, has managed to argue soundly for (5) or (6).
Indeed, ironically enough, the power Martins arrogates to the SC of the DSJ only exists in the absence of the DSJ's bishop on condition the GC permits; see the Constitution, Article IV:
When there is a Bishop in charge of the
Diocese, the Standing Committee shall be the Bishop's Council of
Advice. If there be no Bishop or Bishop Coadjutor or Suffragan
Bishop canonically authorized to act, the Standing Committee shall be
the Ecclesiastical Authority of the Diocese for all purposes declared
by the General Convention.
The power of the SC of the DSJ in the absence of a bishop is not absolute; it is rather conditional. If the authority of the GC may be delegated to the PB, then of course the PB may do exactly what she has in fact done--notify the SC that its authority is suspended. There is a case to be made that--contrary to Martins--the PB has precisely this power according to the Constitution itself.
I hope to have shown the rather ill-tempered comment by Martins that the PB's effort in the DSJ
represents the raw exercise of naked illicit power by the Presiding Bishop
is not adequately grounded in reality. Is it really raw and naked when a case can be made for it directly from the Constitution and Canons? Why the nasty hyperbole? We have yet to see a decent argument that it is in fact illicit, and it seems given his penchant for strife, we are owed at least that.
P.S.
My apologies: I actually like theorizing over law; maybe there's a calling. Who knows? Anyhow, here are a couple more speculative arguments: enjoy.
According to the Constitution in Article V, section 1 the GC is the agent behind the formation of a new diocese. The DSJ is not a new diocese being formed, but an old diocese whose normal administrative apparatus is being reconstituted. The authority to form a new diocese is greater; it follows that GC would have the lesser power to reconsititute if need be. of course, this is already implicit in my Proposition (1) above; these comments serve so far only to confirm (1) supra. As that authority, normally residing in the GC, may be delegated to the PB in virtue of the power inherent in her office, it follows the PB may do what she is doing by the authority of TEC's Constitution, contrary to Martins.
Note at any rate, Article V, section 3 of the Constitution gives a new diocese the power to designate its own bishop, should bishops from dioceses from which it was formed prescind from occupying that office. Normally that power would most likely be overseen in its exercise by the Standing Committee. At any rate, a power to designate a bishop is not alien to the diocese; this section may provide a relevant precedent for action in unusual circumstances, even though the DSJ is not new; it is, of course, an old diocese in an unusual--even unprecedented--situation. That is, given it seems that the Standing Committee of the DSJ is unable to perform, the current PB may simply be acting on behalf of the GC to recognize, and thereby validate, an exercise of power--permitted in the Constitution--by the DSJ on its own behalf. While the SC might be the normal conduit for the flow of this power, it is by no means necessary for the flow of that power, as the power is inherent in the diocese itself. That exercise would be permitted, based on a power inherent in the diocese, referred to in this section--again, contrary to Martins.
Seitz on catholic anglicanism
On T19 recently I came across this comment from Seitz of the ACI, a comment which seems mistaken:
Anglicans are Christians in a Communion (hence ACI). They are not national churches where one uses a retinal scanner to get into a new ‘Christian’ zones. And neither is the Communion a collection of the like-minded in Provinces which are inventing a new kind of Anglicanism—even for very pressing reasons. If it comes to that, the Communion is over anywhere. It may come to that. Some may want it to come to that. Others are wanting to do everything possible to prevent the fracture of anglicanism whilst maintaining things like ‘CA Principles’ (e.g.).
The Anglican Communion to which Seitz refers is not a church; this is not how it was envisaged at its inception, and nothing in its history to this day indicates that over time it became a church. Whatever communion exists in the Anglican Communion, it is not the same communion as that celebrated and enacted in the sacraments of Holy Baptism and the Eucharist.
To my limited knowledge, nobody is ordained simply into the Anglican Communion as a deacon, priest, or bishop or simply baptized into it as laity: "you're a Communionite". Nobody celebrates simply on the Anglican Communion's behalf, save in a derivative sense. At the moment, it cannot be done; there is no causally accessible path.
Indeed, there may be said to be a communion associated with membership in the Anglican Communion, but "communion" in this sense is derivative from a prior relation established in the dominical sacraments as practiced in Christian churches.
Thus, as the Anglican Communion is not a church, if what were known as national churches are not really churches after all, then there are no Anglican churches anywhere. What then of our orders? Our sacraments? All irregular, all the time? Or maybe he would suggest there are in fact many more Anglican churches than anyone ever realized, each diocese being an Anglican church unto itself whether it knew itself to be that or not? Maybe--who can tell? He just seeems to be making this stuff up. Or better: it seems a peculiar service to render expedience, a new liturgy if you will: the ad hoc ministration.
But seriously, his ecclesiological fantasies are supposed to express a normative notion of catholicity? Who buys this rather private notion of "catholic anglicanism"? Foisting this patent absurdity on our divines does them no service. Surely, foisting it on the Episcopal Church and the rest of the Anglican Communion is no service either.
Anglicans are Christians in a Communion (hence ACI). They are not national churches where one uses a retinal scanner to get into a new ‘Christian’ zones. And neither is the Communion a collection of the like-minded in Provinces which are inventing a new kind of Anglicanism—even for very pressing reasons. If it comes to that, the Communion is over anywhere. It may come to that. Some may want it to come to that. Others are wanting to do everything possible to prevent the fracture of anglicanism whilst maintaining things like ‘CA Principles’ (e.g.).
The Anglican Communion to which Seitz refers is not a church; this is not how it was envisaged at its inception, and nothing in its history to this day indicates that over time it became a church. Whatever communion exists in the Anglican Communion, it is not the same communion as that celebrated and enacted in the sacraments of Holy Baptism and the Eucharist.
To my limited knowledge, nobody is ordained simply into the Anglican Communion as a deacon, priest, or bishop or simply baptized into it as laity: "you're a Communionite". Nobody celebrates simply on the Anglican Communion's behalf, save in a derivative sense. At the moment, it cannot be done; there is no causally accessible path.
Indeed, there may be said to be a communion associated with membership in the Anglican Communion, but "communion" in this sense is derivative from a prior relation established in the dominical sacraments as practiced in Christian churches.
Thus, as the Anglican Communion is not a church, if what were known as national churches are not really churches after all, then there are no Anglican churches anywhere. What then of our orders? Our sacraments? All irregular, all the time? Or maybe he would suggest there are in fact many more Anglican churches than anyone ever realized, each diocese being an Anglican church unto itself whether it knew itself to be that or not? Maybe--who can tell? He just seeems to be making this stuff up. Or better: it seems a peculiar service to render expedience, a new liturgy if you will: the ad hoc ministration.
But seriously, his ecclesiological fantasies are supposed to express a normative notion of catholicity? Who buys this rather private notion of "catholic anglicanism"? Foisting this patent absurdity on our divines does them no service. Surely, foisting it on the Episcopal Church and the rest of the Anglican Communion is no service either.
San Joaquin & the Southern Cone
On the face of it, it appears that what Abp. Venables of the Southern Cone was tring to do with Bishop Schofield and the Diocese of San Joaquin was contrary to the canons of the Southern Cone itself. One might have greeted the news of Venables assuming authority as a marginal improvement in the situation, inasmuch as Schofield and those going along with him would then at least have been formally accountable to someone, and would not be left simply to improvise while wandering in a limbo of their own design. But now it seems such optimism was hasty; Venables' assumption of authority reproduces the same type of disorder Schofield's assumption of authority produced. That is, he acts not merely in an area neglected by or left vague in the relevant canons, but acts contrary to the canons. In effect, he assumes a position of sovereignty with respect to those over whom he exercises this power; he enters in to a state of exception with regard to them.
In my opinion, any exercise of that type of authority is grave; what it means for those believers who have in practice been dragged into Schofield and Venables' experiment is that, as I've noted earlier
[t]hey are now in a kind of limbo. They have been made to exist in a space where anything is possible, insofar as they are parishoners.... They have been made the exceptions on the receiving end of an exercise of [extracanonical] sovereign authority, a kind of self-constituting act by Schofield [and Venables]. That is, by acting just as a genuine, regular bishop may, he [and Venables] might constitute[their] power as genuinely and regularly episcopal
and the result for the time being is
[n]ot just a kind of state of nature, but rather a kind of normalization of certain aspects of the state of nature, or better: a new communion of provinces is envisaged with relief, pride, and joy where these aspects are considered normal. Where community is established through such means beyond canon and law, beyond ethical rationality and accountability, it cannot help but instantiate the camp as its type.
That is, the ripples of ecclesial disorder and diminished being initiated by Schofield's salto mortale--recall for example his risible effort to remain both in the Episcopal Church and the Southern Cone as a viable bishop in each--have not gone away. They are spreading and have apparently already enveloped Venables and the Southern Cone.
In my opinion, any exercise of that type of authority is grave; what it means for those believers who have in practice been dragged into Schofield and Venables' experiment is that, as I've noted earlier
[t]hey are now in a kind of limbo. They have been made to exist in a space where anything is possible, insofar as they are parishoners.... They have been made the exceptions on the receiving end of an exercise of [extracanonical] sovereign authority, a kind of self-constituting act by Schofield [and Venables]. That is, by acting just as a genuine, regular bishop may, he [and Venables] might constitute[their] power as genuinely and regularly episcopal
and the result for the time being is
[n]ot just a kind of state of nature, but rather a kind of normalization of certain aspects of the state of nature, or better: a new communion of provinces is envisaged with relief, pride, and joy where these aspects are considered normal. Where community is established through such means beyond canon and law, beyond ethical rationality and accountability, it cannot help but instantiate the camp as its type.
That is, the ripples of ecclesial disorder and diminished being initiated by Schofield's salto mortale--recall for example his risible effort to remain both in the Episcopal Church and the Southern Cone as a viable bishop in each--have not gone away. They are spreading and have apparently already enveloped Venables and the Southern Cone.
Secret Plans!
As you've likely heard, a tiny international clique--a clique that seems to only tenuously include our Presiding Bishop--has launched secret plans to rescue the Episcopal Church, and perhaps thereby the Anglican Communion, from an even wider and more violent schism than we've yet seen. And the plans may succeed: they seem tolerable, they do not reward the extremists from among the Separatists, and indeed seem to sidestep the wild Minns/Sugden axis with its Duncan/Iker/Schofield/Venables/etc minions. One might look forward with a modest measure of hope to a general resolution to the conflict among those who differ over the presenting issues of GC2003, but are acting in good faith to avoid schism. That is, it seems those bent on schism from the Windsor Process' inception are not players in this. These plans are not a recipe for pleasing them; the reasonable majority seems to have finally realized that cannot happen here below. Perhaps then some settlement can be forged from among the good faith parties, with this initial, secret international affair providing a starting point?
Still, this way of doing things just seems so unfortunate: a public forum in the Episcopal Church, or in the Anglican Communion, that could function to support the type of discourse that might have a chance to keep the Communion from fracturing simply does not exist. If solutions are to be found, they must be found sub rosa, on the basis of personal relationships among the remaining reasonable members of the power elite. The General Convention, Lambeth, the Primates meetings et al have in effect forfeited the role of providing the compromises necessary for reconciliation. It would be interesting to ask:
I.
Why this evacuation of power from public discourse? To what extent have competing, purity-obsessed factions become so powerful in our public councils that a Leviathan-prince is required to keep parties in check?
I'm presuming recollection of Hobbes' argument for civil polity's requiring submission to an absolute sovereign, to whom I attach the tag "Leviathan-prince"--the faint allusion to Machiavelli is meant to underscore how much this whole affair looks to the outside like an unprincipled exercise of power. Of course I don't mean to imply there is just one guy involved; strictly, it might be better to speak of an oligarchy with a princeps inter pares in this case.
Regardless of whether we're dealing with one secret sovereign or many, we should ask: Do we really need this Leviathan-prince? Do we need to belong to a Communion that enables such a concentration of unrepresentative and unaccountable power?
There is no open protocol, no provision for representation, no formal, institutional check on the exercise of power in such proceedings as these. They amount to an exercise of pure sovereignty, carried on outside the rules--here indeed thankfully for the sake of a perceived common good--and if actually efficacious, what precedent will have been set? What praxis will have been thereby encouraged?
II.
Are such shady proceedings morally permissible? To some extent, if the irregular procedure succeeds in securing the common good, it is justified, and one may let it pass as--hopefully--a one-time affair. But who thinks the occasion for recourse to the backroom deal will pass soon? Must we look forward to this sort of thing happening again and again? It's alimentary: the patient peristalsis of time and institutional process will likely leave extremists in positions of power on the inside for quite a long time before requiring they pass.
That is, it seems alongside the apparent instruments of unity, about which we have heard so much, and alongside the actual canonical institutions of ecclesial power, the shadowy real instruments of unity and real institutions of eccelsial power may be taking shape.
So: is it morally right for us to submit ourselves to the power such a Leviathan-prince? Even if it were the pragmatic way, maybe we--being faithful rather than merely pragmatic--would be required to prescind and take the resulting consequences.
III.
What then of the apparent instruments and institutions? Why take them seriously? Why pretend? In short: do these proceedings have implications for the development of a Covenant? I should think they do, and I say so with certain words from Seitz in mind:
For those Dioceses which wish to abide by Camp Allen Principles, this Plan offers a way to model full and enthusiastic compliance with Communion life. This is particularly important at a time when the terms of belonging to the wider Communion are under assessment and negotiation.
The discernible trajectory desired by the elite is no secret: finding some way to codify "Camp Allen Principles", or some set of measures of which they would be a principal proper part, for the Communion. It may not matter whether those principles appear in the open letter of the document, or are understood tacitly as principles guiding a sovereign praxis.
IV.
The apparent institutions/instruments which seem to channel power are one thing; and they were already operating outside fair procedure in the Primates' Meetings in my opinion. The stream of discourse issuing from them occupies a great deal of time and energy; one reads them and analyzes them taking their justifications and interpretations at face value to represent what is actually going on and why it is going on with a rough accuracy.
But what if, behind the apparent stream of institutional discourse, there is another genuinely efficacious discourse, in which horses are traded, deals made, authentic opinions voiced and the painful alternatives weighed while compromises grind through? Would that render the apparent stream of institutional discourse merely ideological, a mere shadow play for the children--and the adults obliged to sit through it all? Would that make the Covenant in the end an ideological instrument, a sop for chumps, so that it becomes a stick to be weilded--whatever it might say in the end--by members of the elite against those who defy its dictates?
The good sought by this slice of the Anglican power elite, whether it really includes our Presiding Bishop, is laudable: peace in our time. But proceed with your eyes open.
Still, this way of doing things just seems so unfortunate: a public forum in the Episcopal Church, or in the Anglican Communion, that could function to support the type of discourse that might have a chance to keep the Communion from fracturing simply does not exist. If solutions are to be found, they must be found sub rosa, on the basis of personal relationships among the remaining reasonable members of the power elite. The General Convention, Lambeth, the Primates meetings et al have in effect forfeited the role of providing the compromises necessary for reconciliation. It would be interesting to ask:
I.
Why this evacuation of power from public discourse? To what extent have competing, purity-obsessed factions become so powerful in our public councils that a Leviathan-prince is required to keep parties in check?
I'm presuming recollection of Hobbes' argument for civil polity's requiring submission to an absolute sovereign, to whom I attach the tag "Leviathan-prince"--the faint allusion to Machiavelli is meant to underscore how much this whole affair looks to the outside like an unprincipled exercise of power. Of course I don't mean to imply there is just one guy involved; strictly, it might be better to speak of an oligarchy with a princeps inter pares in this case.
Regardless of whether we're dealing with one secret sovereign or many, we should ask: Do we really need this Leviathan-prince? Do we need to belong to a Communion that enables such a concentration of unrepresentative and unaccountable power?
There is no open protocol, no provision for representation, no formal, institutional check on the exercise of power in such proceedings as these. They amount to an exercise of pure sovereignty, carried on outside the rules--here indeed thankfully for the sake of a perceived common good--and if actually efficacious, what precedent will have been set? What praxis will have been thereby encouraged?
II.
Are such shady proceedings morally permissible? To some extent, if the irregular procedure succeeds in securing the common good, it is justified, and one may let it pass as--hopefully--a one-time affair. But who thinks the occasion for recourse to the backroom deal will pass soon? Must we look forward to this sort of thing happening again and again? It's alimentary: the patient peristalsis of time and institutional process will likely leave extremists in positions of power on the inside for quite a long time before requiring they pass.
That is, it seems alongside the apparent instruments of unity, about which we have heard so much, and alongside the actual canonical institutions of ecclesial power, the shadowy real instruments of unity and real institutions of eccelsial power may be taking shape.
So: is it morally right for us to submit ourselves to the power such a Leviathan-prince? Even if it were the pragmatic way, maybe we--being faithful rather than merely pragmatic--would be required to prescind and take the resulting consequences.
III.
What then of the apparent instruments and institutions? Why take them seriously? Why pretend? In short: do these proceedings have implications for the development of a Covenant? I should think they do, and I say so with certain words from Seitz in mind:
For those Dioceses which wish to abide by Camp Allen Principles, this Plan offers a way to model full and enthusiastic compliance with Communion life. This is particularly important at a time when the terms of belonging to the wider Communion are under assessment and negotiation.
The discernible trajectory desired by the elite is no secret: finding some way to codify "Camp Allen Principles", or some set of measures of which they would be a principal proper part, for the Communion. It may not matter whether those principles appear in the open letter of the document, or are understood tacitly as principles guiding a sovereign praxis.
IV.
The apparent institutions/instruments which seem to channel power are one thing; and they were already operating outside fair procedure in the Primates' Meetings in my opinion. The stream of discourse issuing from them occupies a great deal of time and energy; one reads them and analyzes them taking their justifications and interpretations at face value to represent what is actually going on and why it is going on with a rough accuracy.
But what if, behind the apparent stream of institutional discourse, there is another genuinely efficacious discourse, in which horses are traded, deals made, authentic opinions voiced and the painful alternatives weighed while compromises grind through? Would that render the apparent stream of institutional discourse merely ideological, a mere shadow play for the children--and the adults obliged to sit through it all? Would that make the Covenant in the end an ideological instrument, a sop for chumps, so that it becomes a stick to be weilded--whatever it might say in the end--by members of the elite against those who defy its dictates?
The good sought by this slice of the Anglican power elite, whether it really includes our Presiding Bishop, is laudable: peace in our time. But proceed with your eyes open.
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